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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the effects of monetary policy in a two-sector cash-in-advance 
economy of human capital accumulation. Agents concern about their social status 
represented by the relative physical capital and relative human capital. We find that if 
the desire for social status depends only on relative physical capital, money is 
superneutral in the growth-rate sense. However, if the desire for social status depends 
on relative human capital, the money growth rate will have a positive effect on the 
long-run economic growth rate. Furthermore, an increase in the desire to pursue 
human capital will raise the long-run growth rate, but an increase in the desire to 
pursue physical capital will lower it. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
Social status has long interested economists in a variety of research fields; see, among 
others, Cole et al. (1992), Bakshi and Chen (1996), Fisher and Hof (2005) and Chang 
et al. (2008). The concept of social status can be traced back to the “spirit of capitalism” 
of Weber (1958) and the “wealth effects” of Kurz (1968). In contemporary research, the 
desire for social status is usually represented by wealth-induced preference in economic 
models. By motivating the accumulation of physical capital, the presence of 
wealth-enhanced social status will affect households’ consumption and savings decisions.  
This will in turn affect economic growth (Zou, 1994; Wirl, 1994). 
There is a growing literature concerning the role of social status in a monetary 
economy and its impact on the effectiveness of monetary policy. Tobin (1965) 
demonstrates that in a descriptive aggregate model, a permanent increase in the growth 
rate of nominal money raises the inflation rate and lowers the real interest rate. This 
leads to portfolio substitution from real balances to capital (Tobin’s effect). 1 
Stockman (1981) develops a cash-in-advance (CIA) model where both consumption 
and investment are liquidity constrained and shows that an increase in the money 
growth rate will lower the steady-state value of physical capital.2 Social status is 
introduced into a CIA model by Gong and Zou (2001), Chang et al. (2000, 2003) and 
Chen and Guo (2009) in order to study how wealth-enhanced social status affects the 
impact of monetary policy on economic growth.3 Gong and Zou (2001) and Chang et 
al. (2000, 2003) demonstrate that with the presence of social status, the money growth 
                                                 
1  However, Sidrauski (1967) argues that in an infinite-horizon, representative-agent model, money 
growth does not affect the steady-state value of physical capital. 
2  Based on a CIA model, Abel (1985) shows that monetary policies will not affect the steady-state 
value of physical capital if the cash-in-advance constraint is applied solely to consumption. Note that 
endogenous growth is not exhibited in Stockman (1981) and Abel (1985). The effectiveness of 
monetary policy in an endogenous-growth CIA model is examined by Chang et al. (2000), Suen and Yip 
(2005) and Chen and Guo (2011). 
3  Note that Chang et al. (2000) and Chen and Guo (2009) display endogenous growth while Gong and 
Zou (2001) and Chang et al. (2003) do not. 
 3
rate will positively affect the level or growth rate of output if consumption is liquidity 
constrained. However, Chen and Guo (2009) argue that if the cash-in-advance 
constraint is applied to both consumption and investment, an increase in the growth 
rate of money will decrease the economic growth rate even under wealth-induced 
preferences. The related literature is summarized in Table 1.4 
<Table 1 is inserted about here> 
The focus of previous studies examining the role of social status in a monetary 
economy has been on the role of physical capital. These studies have largely ignored the 
role of human capital. In this paper, we investigate how social status affects the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in a two-sector endogenous-growth CIA model with 
Lucas-type human capital accumulation.5 Furthermore, the incorporation of human 
capital into the model allows us to consider the impact of social-status formation.6 We 
assume that higher social status is bestowed on relative physical capital and relative 
human capital. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study the impact 
of monetary policy in a monetary economy with social status represented by relative 
human capital. Feathermand and Stevens (1982) demonstrate that human capital 
appears to be an important determinant of social status. Besides a monetary reward, 
professionals often earn rewards in the form of social esteem. Based on this idea, 
Fershtman and Weiss (1993) and Fershtman et al. (1996) develop a general equilibrium 
model with social status represented by occupation which depends on human capital to 
study the interplay between occupation and economic growth. 
Monetary policies can affect the accumulation of physical capital through two 
                                                 
4 Table 1 is not intended to be an exhaustive literature review and many important contributions may 
not be included. 
5 The superneutrality of money in a two-sector CIA model with wealth-induced social status is studied 
by Chen (2011a, 2011b). 
6  In the literature, social status is represented by a variety of formations. For example, Corneo and 
Jeanne (1997b) and Clemens (2004) use relative wealth to represent social status. Rauscher (1997) and 
Corneo and Jeanne (1997a) use conspicuous consumption to represent social status.  
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channels. Tobin’s effect demonstrates that a higher money growth rate increases 
investment due to the portfolio substitution effect. However, an increase in the 
inflation rate also reduces the real money balance which in turn will affect investment 
through the cash-in-advance constraint. There are two types of cash-in-advance 
constraints considered in this paper. We first assume that consumption is liquidity 
constrained. In this case, an increase in the money growth rate reduces future 
consumption through the cash-in-advance constraint. This induces the agent to use 
current consumption to substitute for future consumption and reduces investment. 
Second, we assume that both consumption and investment are liquidity constrained. In 
this case, an increase in the money growth rate induces a lower real balance which 
restricts the agent’s ability to both consume and invest. 
In both cases, we show that a two-sector endogenous-growth CIA model with 
social status can be represented by a four-dimensional dynamic system, and we also 
examine the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. We find that the 
superneutrality of money in the growth-rate sense depends on the nature of the 
formation of social status. When the social status depends only on relative physical 
capital, changes in monetary policy will not affect economic growth and money is 
growth-rate superneutral. This is because although the existence of wealth-induced 
preferences increases physical capital accumulation, it lowers the incentive for human 
capital accumulation. However, when the desire for social status depends on relative 
human capital, the money growth rate will positively affect the economic growth. The 
presence of human-capital-induced preference reinforces the incentive for human 
capital accumulation (direct effect). Since human capital and physical capital are 
complements in the process of production, an increase in the human capital 
accumulation will increase the return of investment in physical capital (indirect effect). 
Both effects encourage economic growth. 
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When the desire to pursue physical capital increases, the incentive of physical 
capital accumulation becomes higher and causes higher investment in physical capital. 
This induces a larger fraction of human capital to be involved in output production and 
the long-run growth rate will decrease since a smaller fraction of human capital is 
devoted to human capital accumulation. On the other hand, when the desire to pursue 
human capital increases, it strengthens the motivation of human capital accumulation. 
The long-run economic growth will increase because of a higher fraction of human 
capital devoted to human capital accumulation. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we 
develop a two-sector endogenous growth model where consumption is liquidity 
constrained and examine the growth-rate superneutrality of money. In Sections 3, we 
study the effects of money growth rate on the long-run growth in a monetary economy 
where both consumption and investment are liquidity constrained. The final section 
concludes. 
2.  A TWO-SECTOR CIA MODEL 
We begin our analysis by considering a two-sector CIA model of human capital 
accumulation, with the economy comprising of a representative, infinitely-lived agent. 
Following the idea proposed by Corneo and Jeanne (1997), we assume that social 
status is represented by the relative physical (human) capital. The representative agent 
cares about both consumption ( tc ) and social status, which is composed by the relative 
physical capital and relative human capital. The discounted lifetime utility is: 
                    0 )exp()/()/()log( dttHhvKkvc ttttt  ,           
where )1,0(  is the discount factor, tk  and tK  respectively denote individual 
and aggregate physical capital and th  and tH  respectively represent individual and 
aggregate human capital. The parameters 0  and 0  respectively denote the 
desire for social status represented by physical and human capital. Let )/(' tt Qqv  
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represent the derivative of function )/( tt Qqv  with respect to ( tt Qq / ). The periodic 
utility function )/( tt Qqv  has the properties that 1)1(' v , 
0/)/('/  ttttq qQqvqvv t  and 0/ 22  tqq qvv tt  where tt kq  , th  and 
tt KQ  , tH .  
We consider an endogenous growth monetary economy comprising of two sectors, 
one of which produces output used for consumption and investment, while the other 
produces human capital. Let tu  and ( tu1 ) respectively represent the proportion of 
human capital devoted to the production of output and the accumulation of human 
capital. Labor supply, which is inelastic, is normalized to unity. There is a 
constant-returns-to-scale production technology for output ( ty ) which is produced by 
using both physical capital and effective labor ( tt hu ): 
                1)( tttt huAky ,                         (1) 
where 0A  is total factor productivity and )1,0(  denotes the capital share of 
output.  
Following Lucas (1988), we assume that human capital accumulation evolves 
based on the following equation: 
                       ttt huBh )1( 

,                          (2) 
where B  represents the technology parameter for human capital accumulation.7 
In period t , the government injects money into the economy by giving nominal 
lump-sum transfers to the representative agent. We assume that the nominal money 
supply grows at the rate of 0 . Let tp  and tm  denote the common price and 
individual real money balance in period t . The representative agent uses the real 
money balance in period t , determined in the previous period 1t , to buy goods for 
consumption and investment. Thus, the cash-in-advance constraint for the 
                                                 
7  We assume B  so that the growth rate at equilibrium is positive when social status is not 
present.  
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representative agent is: 
               ttt mic  .                           (3) 
When 0 , the cash-in-advance constraint is only applied to consumption. When 
1 , both consumption and investment are subject to the cash-in-advance 
constraint.  
The budget constraint for the representative agent is: 
ttttttttttt mhuwkrmic  

,                (4) 
where ti  denotes investment, tr  is the real rental rate of physical capital, tw  is the 
real wage, ttt pp /
  represents the inflation rate and tt m   is the real 
lump-sum transfers that households receive from the monetary authority. 
The law of motion of capital follows: 
               ttt kik 

,                           (5) 
where ]1,0[  is the depreciation rate of physical capital. The real interest rate is 
therefore represented by ( tr ). 
Let ht , mt  and kt  respectively represent the co-state variables of Eqs. (2), 
(4) and (5) and t  represents the multiplier of Eq. (3). The first-order necessary 
conditions for the representative agent’s optimization problem are: 
                          tmt
tc
 1 ,                              (6) 
                         kttmt   ,                             (7) 
                         Bw httmt   ,                               (8) 
                   tmt
tt
t
ktkt rKK
kv  


 1')( ,                 (9) 
                       tmttmt  

)( ,                        (10) 
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               )1(1' thtttmt
tt
t
tht uBuwHH
hv 


  ,           (11) 
plus the transversality conditions: 
         0lim  tkt
t
t
ke  ,    0lim  tmttt me  ,    0lim  thttt he  .     
Eq. (6) demonstrates that the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of consumption. 
Eqs. (7) and (9) govern the evolution of physical capital, where the marginal utility 
benefit from agents’ status-seeking physical capital accumulation is captured by the 
term 
tt
t
KK
kv 1' 


 . Eq. (10) demonstrates that the marginal values of real money 
holdings equals the marginal costs. Eq. (8) states that the marginal returns of human 
capital from final production and human capital accumulation should be equal and it 
determines the allocation of human capital. Eqs. (8) and (11) together govern the 
evolution of human capital over time, where 
tt
t
HH
hv 1' 


  reflects agents’ status 
seeking of human capital accumulation. 
As is common in the literature, we assume that the cash-in-advance constraint is 
strictly binding ( 0t ). In a symmetric equilibrium all agents consume and invest the 
same amount of goods, own the same amount of capital and real money balance and 
devote the same amount of human capital in production. That is, tt Cc  ,  tt Ii  ,   
tt Kk  , tt Hh  , tt Mm   and tt Uu   where tC , tI , tM  and tU  
respectively represent the aggregate consumption, investment, real money balance and 
the fraction of human capital devoted to the production of output. In the equilibrium, 
the factor prices are: 
                        11 )( tttt HUKAr ,                     (12) 
                       )()1( tttt HUKAw .                   (13) 
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The law of motion of the real money balance is: 
                ttt MM )(  

.                          (14) 
The goods market clearing condition implies: 
                          tttt YKKC 
  ,                        (15) 
where tY  is the aggregate output. We define two stationary variables as 
t
t
t K
Cz   
and 
t
t
t K
Hx  . Combining Eqs. (2) and (15) gives us the evolution of tx :  
tttt
t
t
t
t
t
t zxUAUB
K
K
H
H
x
x  

 1)()1( .          (16) 
Substituting Eqs. (8) and (13) into Eq. (11), we can derive: 
                           
ththt
ht
H
B 

 

.                     (17) 
2.1  Cash for Consumption Only 
We first consider the case where the cash-in-advance constraint is applied only to 
consumption (that is, 0 ). We define another stationary variable as 
ktt
t K 
1 . 
The inflation rate is determined by Eqs. (6), (7), (9) and (10): 
  
t
t
tttt z
xUA
   1)(1 .              (18) 
Combining Eqs. (7), (9) and (15), the evolution of t  is governed by:  
tttt
t
t zxUA  


 1))(1( .              (19) 
Using Eqs. (3), (14), (15) and (18), the dynamics of tz  is based on:  
t
t
tttt
t
t
z
zxUA
z
z    

1))(1(1 .            (20) 
Combining Eqs. (8) and (17) gives us: 
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                     




 tt
t
ht
ht
UxA
BB 1)1(
.                  (21) 
Combining Eqs. (7)-(9), (16) and (21), the dynamics of tU  is governed by:  
ttt
tt
t
t
t zUB
UxA
B
U
U 





 



 

)1(
)1(
1)1( 1 .   (22) 
Thus, the dynamic behavior of the economy is represented by a four- dimensional 
dynamic system of Eqs. (16), (19), (20) and (22) in tx , t , tz  and tU . 
2.2  The BGP Equilibrium  
Along the balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium, tC , tY , tK , tH  and tM  grow at a 
common growth rate ( *g ), while the common growth rate for kt  and mt  is ( *g ). Thus, 
along the BGP equilibrium, the stationery variables t , tz , tx , and tU  do not grow. 
Let  , z , x  and U  represent the steady-state values of t , tz , tx  and tU . 
From Eqs. (16), (19), (20) and (22), the steady-state conditions are: 
)1(
])1()[1( *



 UBz ,                 (23a) 
                           
  z)1(  ,                      (23b) 
        zxUA )]1(1[))(1( 1 ,            (23c) 

 





)1(
)]1(1[
)1(1 **
*
UB
z
zUB .          (23d) 
From Eqs. (23a), (23d), it follows that U  is implicitly determined by:  
                      0),,,( * Uf ,                       (24a) 
where  






),,,()]1(1[
),,()1(1)1(),,,( 

Uz
UzUBUBUf    (24b) 
and  
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)1(
])1()[1(),,( 
 
 UBUz .                   (24c) 
Eq. (24c) implies that 0/),,(  UUz  .To examine the existence and 
uniqueness of the steady state, we take the first order derivatives of ),,,( Uf  
and obtain: 
0
)},,()]1(1[{
),,()},,()]1(1[){,,(
)1(1
),,,(
2 
















Uz
U
UzUUzUz
B
U
Uf
Thus, ),,,( Uf  is a monotonically decreasing function in U . Since ]1,0[U , 
the boundary values of )(Uf  are:  
                          0)0(0  ff ,    





})]1(1[){1(
])1)[(1(1)1(1 
 Bff . 
Therefore, a sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of the steady 
state is that 01 f . That is,  


)]1(1[)]1)((1[)1(
})]1(1[){1(
1 
 BB . 
Function ),,,( Uf  is illustrated in Figure 1. We summarize our results in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 1. When the desire for the social status is present and there is a 
cash-in-advance constraint applied to consumption in a two-sector 
CIA model with human capital accumulation, there exists a unique 
BGP equilibrium if 1BB  . 
<Figure 1 is inserted about here> 
Eq. (24a) indicates that the solution of U  is: 
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                        ),,(  UU .                      (24d) 
The BGP growth rate can be calculated by using Eq. (2): 
)),,(1(),,(*   UBg .                (25) 
We now turn to examine the effects of monetary policy. The first-order partial 
derivate of ),,,( Uf  with respect to   is: 
)]1([)},,()]1(1[{
])1()[1)(,,(),,,(
2 






Uz
UBUBUzUf .    (26) 
Regarding social status, there are four possible situations. First, we consider the 
case where the desire for social status is not present ( 0  ). In this case, Eq. (26) 
indicates that 0/),,,(  Uf . That is, changes in the money growth rate will 
not affect the fraction of human capital used for human capital accumulation and the 
long-run economic growth rate. This confirms the results found by Marquis and 
Reffett (1991). Furthermore, using Eqs. (23a)-(23d) and (25), one can derive a 
constant BGP growth rate:  
 Bg * .                         (27a) 
A permanent increase in   reduces the real money balance, which depresses 
future consumption through the cash-in-advance constraint. Thus, the agent tends to 
use current consumption to substitute for future consumption, thereby reducing 
investment to the detriment of physical capital accumulation. On the other hand, an 
increase in the inflation rate raises the cost of money holdings. This causes the 
representative household to substitute out of real balances and into physical capital. 
These two effects cancel each other out so that an increase in   does not affect the 
long-run economic growth rate.  
Note that the BGP growth rate in the CIA model with the standard Barro-Rebelo 
“AK” type production is: 
                                Ag * .                      (27b) 
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Eqs. (27a) and (27b) indicate that when the desire for social status is not present, 
money is superneutral in the growth-rate sense, independent of the consideration of 
human capital accumulation. However, the long-run growth rate is driven by the 
production function in the “AK“ model while it is driven by the human capital 
formation in an endogenous model with human capital accumulation. 
Next, we consider the case where the desire for social status is represented by the 
level of physical capital ( 0 ). In this case, Eq. (26) indicates that 
0/),,,(  Uf  and money is superneutral in the growth-rate sense. The 
long-run growth rate is the same as the one given by Eq. (27b). This finding of the 
growth-rate superneutrality of money in a two-sector endogenous-growth economy 
with the wealth-induced preference is in line with the results in Chen (2011a) where 
the social status is represented by the absolute physical capital.  
Note that this result is very different from the result found in the CIA model 
without human capital accumulation. Chang, Hsieh and Lai (2000) show that the BGP 
growth rate in the CIA model with “AK” type production function and status seeking 
is: 
                      
  )1(1
* Ag .                   (27c) 
Eq. (27c) implies that money growth rate positively affects the economic growth rate 
in the long run when human capital accumulation is not taken into consideration. Our 
finding is different from theirs because the presence of social-status seeking will 
strengthen the motivation of physical capital accumulation but lead to a relative 
reduction in the incentive for human capital accumulation. The former is beneficial to 
economic growth while the latter hurts the economic growth. Overall, the economic 
growth rate is not affected by the money growth rate. 
Third, when social status is represented by the level of human capital ( 0 ,
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0 ), Eq. (26) indicates that under this case, 0/),,,(  Uf . Then an 
increase   will shift the curve of ),,,( Uf  in Figure 1 downward. This will 
reduce U  and increase ( U1 ). Therefore, an increase in   will raise *g . The 
presence of social status strengthens the motivation of human capital accumulation. 
Moreover, since physical capital and human capital are complements in the production 
function, an increase in the rate of human capital accumulation will also raise the 
returns to physical capital and investment in physical capital will increase. Both 
increases in human capital and physical capital accumulation encourage the economic 
growth rate. 
The last case we consider is that in which social status is represented by the levels 
of physical capital and human capital. In this case, 0/),,,(  Uf . and an 
increase in the money growth rate will raise the long-run economic growth rate. From 
our analysis in the previous two cases, we know that the non-superneutrality of money 
is caused by the presence of social status represented by relative human capital. We 
summarize our findings in Table 1 and in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2:  When a cash-in-advance constraint is applied to consumption, the 
growth-rate superneutrality of money is conditional on the specification 
of social status formation. Money is superneutral in the growth-rate 
sense if there is no desire for social status or if social status depends 
only on relative physical capital. However, if social status depends on 
relative human capital, an increase in the money growth rate will raise 
the BGP growth rate.  
To study the impact of social status, we first calculate the first-order partial derivate 
of ),,,( Uf  with respect to  : 
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0
)]1([)},,()]1(1[{
])1()[,,()1()1(),,,(
2
2







Uz
UBUzBUUf .   (28) 
Eq. (28) implies that an increase in   will shift )( Uf  upward. Therefore, an 
increase in   raises *U and reduces )1( U , so the long-run economic growth rate 
will decrease. This is because an increase in   induces higher investment in physical 
capital and also causes a larger fraction of human capital to be involved in output 
production. With the decrease in the fraction of human capital devoted to human 
capital accumulation, the BGP growth rate decreases. 
Then we calculate the first-order partial derivative of ),,,( Uf  with respect to 
 : 
0
),,()]1(1[
),,()1(),,,( 






Uz
UzBUUf .          (29) 
Eq. (29) implies that an increase in   will shift )( Uf  downward .Therefore, 
an increase in σ reduces U  and thus raises g . Since an increase in   reinforces 
the motivation to accumulate human capital, it causes a higher fraction of human 
capital to be devoted to human capital accumulation. Therefore, the long-run economic 
growth increases.  
<Table 2 is inserted about here> 
Because the model is represented by a four-dimensional dynamical system, it is 
difficult to examine the stability around the equilibrium analytically. Thus, we resort to 
numerical methods and study the local property of the dynamic behavior around the 
equilibrium by assigning reasonable parameter values. We set 3/1 , 2.0 , 
025.0 , 1.0A , 02.0B  and 05.0 . Table 2 presents values of *U , *z , 
*x , and *g  with varying  ,   and  . Rows 2, 3 and 4 display the effects with an 
increase in   from 0.05 to 1, rows 2, 5 and 6 present the impacts of an increase in 
  from 0.8 to 1.2 and rows 2, 7 and 8 show the impacts with an increase in   from 
0.8 to 1.2. Our numerical results show that an increase in   or   will lower U , 
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but will raise *g . On the other hand, an increase in   will increase U , but will 
decrease *g . To study the stability around the equilibrium, we compute the Jacobian 
matrix of the dynamical system of Eqs. (16), (19), (20) and (22) evaluated at the steady 
state and calculate its eigenvalues. In all cases shown in Table 2, there are three 
eigenvalues with positive real parts and one eigenvalue with negative real part. Since 
there are three jump variables ( t , tz  and tU ) and one non-jump variable ( tx ) in 
the model, this indicates that the BGP equilibrium exhibits saddle-path stability in all 
cases.  
3.  CASH FOR CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT 
We now turn to consider the case where 1 . That is, the cash-in-advance constraint 
applied to both consumption and investment. In order to simplify the derivation, 
instead of using tp , we define a new stationary variable 
mt
kt
t 
  . Combining Eqs. 
(6)-(8) and (17), we have: 
                     




 tt
tt
ht
ht
UxA
BzB 1)1(
.                  (30) 
Combining the binding cash-in-advance constraint and the resource constraint, we 
can derive:  
  1)( ttttt HUKAM .                      (31) 
Taking logarithms on both sides of Eq. (31) and differentiating with respect to 
time, then combining with Eq. (14), the inflation rate is endogenously determined by: 










t
t
t
t
t
t
t H
H
U
U
K
K )1(  .              (32) 
Combining Eqs. (6), (7), (9), (10) and (32), we have:  
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


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
1)1()1(
)()1(
)()1(
1
.    
(33) 
Combining Eqs. (6), (7), (9) and (15) gives us:  
            
 




  1)(1)1( tt
t
t
t
t xUAz
z
z .            (34) 
Using Eqs. (8), (10), (16), (30) and (32), the dynamics of tU  can be expressed 
as: 
                    
 

 tt
tt
tt
t
t
UxA
zBBU
U
U
1)1(
1 .            (35) 
Eqs. (16) and (33)-(35) constitute a four-dimensional dynamic system of equations 
represented by tx , t , tz  and tU .  
3.1  The BGP Equilibrium  
Along the BGP equilibrium, the stationery variables tx , t , tz  and tU  do not grow. 
From Eqs. (16) and (33)-(35), the steady state values x ,  , z  and U  are 
determined by the following equations:  
  1* ,                         (36a) 
)1(
)1(])1()[1( *



 UBz ,            (36b) 
   )1()( *1 UBzxUA ,                   (36c)
***** )1(])1()[)(1( zBUUBzBU   .      (36d) 
From Eqs. (36b) and (36d), it follows that U  is implicitly determined by:  
                          0),,,( *  U ,                   (37a) 
where 
),,()1(])1(),,()[)(1(
),,,(


UBUzUBUzBU
U


      (37b) 
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and  
 )1(
)1(])1()[1(),,( 
 
 UBUz .            (37c) 
Eq. (37a) indicates that the solution of U  is: 
                           ),,(  UU .                   (37d) 
Once U  is determined, 
z  and x  can be determined uniquely by Eqs. 
(36b)-(36c). Eq. (37b) implies that to guarantee the existence of the solution of 
)1,0(* U , the parameters are subject to the constraint *BU .  
From Eq. (37c), we can easily derive that 0/),,(  UUz  . Using Eq. 
(37a)-(37c), we have: 
              0
),,,(),,(),,,( 21 



U
Ug
U
Ug
U
U  ,         (38) 
where 
0),,()(])1(),,([)1(),,(1 


 

 
 B
U
UzBUUBUzBUg   
and 
0
)1(
)1(])21()[1()1(),,,(2 
 
 UBBUg . 
Eq. (38) indicates that ),,,( U  is a monotonically decreasing function in 
U . Since ]1,0[U , the boundary values of ),,,( U  are:  
             0
)1(
])1)()[(1()1(
0 
 
 B , 
)1(
]}))(1[(])1()[)(1){(1(
1 


 BB , 
where 0  and 1  are boundary values evaluated at 0U  and 1U , 
respectively. 
Therefore, a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the steady state is that 
01  . That is,  
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])1()[1(]))(1[(
])1()[1(
2 


 BB . 
The BGP growth rate is given in Eq. (26).  
To examine how the money growth rate affects the long-run growth rate, we first 
consider case where the desire for social status is not present ( 0  ) or is 
represented solely by physical capital ( 0 ). Eq. (37a) indicates that under these two 
cases, the fraction of human capital devoted to production is constant and equals 
BU /*  . Thus, money is superneutral in the growth-rate sense since changes in the 
money growth rate do not affect the fraction of human capital devoted to human 
capital accumulation and the long-run economic growth rate. These results are 
consistent with the findings in Marquis and Reffett (1991) and Chen (2011b). In both 
cases, the long-run economic growth rate is:  Bg * .  
Our findings of the growth-rate superneutrality of money when social status is not 
present or when it is represented solely by physical capital are very different from 
previous findings in the “AK” model without human capital accumulation. Chen and 
Guo (2000) show that in the “AK” model with cash constraint applied on both 
consumption and investment, the BGP growth rate is driven by the production 
function: 
                            ** AKzAg ,                        
where )]1)(1/[()]()1([*   Az AK . This implies that an 
increase money is not growth-rate superneutral because an increase in the money 
growth rate will reduce the long-run growth rate ( 0/*  g ), independent of the 
presence of status seeking. 
To understand why our result is different from those obtained in the “AK” model, 
note that BGP growth rate in our model is governed by the human capital formation. 
From the economy’s resource constraint and Eq. (34), we have: 
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.          (39) 
Eq. (39) can be interpreted as an Euler equation in a model with relative wealth 
preferences and CIA constraint. The modified real rate of return 
)/( tttt zrR    is composed by the effective real rate of return )/(  ttr  
and the status related component tz . Using the steady-state conditions, we can derive 
that under these two conditions: 
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An increase in the money growth rate raises the inflation rate and the cost of 
money holdings. This will encourage investment in physical capital because the 
representative household substitutes out of real balances and into physical capital. But 
a higher inflation rate reduces the real money holdings and lowers consumption and 
investment through the cash-in-advance constraint. When the desire for social status is 
not present ( 0  ), the two effects cancel each other out and the effective real 
rate of return remains unaffected (Eq. (40b)). As a result, investment of physical 
capital is not affected and the allocation of human capital between production function 
and human capital accumulation remains the same. Thus, BGP growth rate is not 
affected by changes in the rate of money growth.  
When the desire for social-status of physical capital is present ( 0 ), it lowers 
the effective real rate of return (Eq. (40b)). However, the presence of social status of 
physical capital raises the status related component of the modified real rate of return 
(Eq.(40a)). These two effects will cancel each other out and the modified real rate of 
return remains unaffected by the growth rate of money ( 0/   R ). Then the 
 21
allocation of human capital between production function and human capital 
accumulation remains unchanged and BGP growth rate is still not affected by the 
monetary policy and money is still growth-rate superneutral. 
When social status depends on the relative human capital ( 0 ), we compute 
the first-order partial derivate of ),,(  UU  with respect to   and get:8 
 0),,( 
 

U . 
This indicates that an increase   reduces U  and raises ( U1 ). Therefore, an 
increase in   will increase *g  and money is not growth-rate superneutral. This is 
because the presence of social status of human capital strengthens the motivation to 
accumulate human capital and this will in turn raise the economic growth rate. 
Our result of a positive output-growth effect of money in a CIA model where 
consumption and investment are liquidity constrained is very different from those 
found in the literature. As shown in the third column of Table 1, previous studies 
demonstrate that if both consumption and investment are liquidity constrained, an 
increase in the money growth rate will negatively affect the steady-state output or the 
BGP growth rate in a one-sector CIA model, regardless of the presence of social status. 
Marquis and Reffett (1991) and Chen (2011b) find that the positive output-growth 
effect of money no longer exists when introducing human capital accumulation into a 
traditional CIA model. In a two-sector CIA model money is superneutral in the 
growth-rate sense when there is no social-status seeking or when the desire for social 
status is represented by physical capital. In this paper, we show that an increase in the 
money growth rate can positively affect the BGP growth rate if the social status 
formation depends on human capital. Our results are summarized in the following 
proposition: 
                                                 
8  See Appendix for the first-order partial derivatives of ),,(  UU  with respect to  ,   
and  . 
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Proposition 3:  When a cash-in-advance constraint is applied to consumption and 
investment, money is superneutral in the growth-rate sense if the desire 
for social status does not depend on relative human capital. However, if 
the desire for social status depends on relative human capital, an 
increase in the money growth rate will raise the BGP growth rate.  
To study the impact of social status, we calculate the first-order partial derivates of 
),,( U  with respect to   and  and obtain: 
0),,( 
 

U
 
  and      0),,( 
 

U .        
Therefore, similar to the economy where the cash-in-advance constraint is solely 
applied to consumption, an increase in   will lower the BGP growth rate while an 
increase in   will raise the BGP growth rate.  
<Table 3 is inserted about here> 
Using the same parameterization as in Table 2, Table 3 presents values of *U , 
*z , *x , and *g  with varying  ,   and  when both consumption and 
investments are liquidity constrained. The numerical results show that U  will 
decrease and *g  will increase with an increase in   or  . But an increase in   
will increase U  lower 
*g . In all cases, there are three eigenvalues with positive real 
parts and one eigenvalue with negative real part for the Jacobain matrix of the 
dynamical system of Eqs. (16) and (33)-(35) evaluated at the steady state. This implies 
that the BGP equilibrium exhibits saddle-path stability since there are three jump 
variables ( t , tz  and tU ) and one non-jump variable ( tx ) in the model.  
4.  CONCLUSIONS  
This paper examines the growth-rate superneutrality of money in a two-sector 
endogenous-growth CIA model with desire for social status. We consider two 
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scenarios: the cash-in-advance constraint applied solely to consumption and the 
cash-in-advance constraint applied to consumption and investment. In both scenarios, 
we find that money is growth-rate superneutral when the desire for social status 
depends only on relative physical capital. However, when the formation for social 
status depends on relative human capital, an increase in the growth rate of money will 
positively affect the long-run growth rate. This positive output-growth effect of money 
overturns the traditional consensus that an increase in the money growth rate will 
lower the long-run growth rate when both consumption and investment are liquidity 
constrained. 
We conclude this paper with the suggestion that this study can easily be extended 
and applied to a variety of studies, pointing out three possible directions. First, we can 
extend the model by assuming that human capital accumulation also depends on the 
input of physical capital and examine how changes in the human capital accumulation 
function affects the effectiveness of monetary policies. Second, we consider a 
non-separable utility function. Third, we can consider a cash-in-advance constraint 
applied to consumption, physical capital investment, and human capital investment 
and examine the impacts of these constraints on economic growth. 
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Table 1  Related literature of the effectiveness of monetary policy 
 
 tt mc        ttt mic       
Panel A (one-sector model):  Aky    
No social status Abel (1985): 0/* ddk  
Stockman (1981): 
0/* ddk  
With social status 
Gong and Zou (2001) and  
Chang et al. (2000): 
0/* ddk  
Gong and Zou (2001) and  
Chang et al. (2003): 
0/* ddk  
Panel B (one-sector AK model):    Aky   
No social status Chang et al. (2000): 0/* ddg  
Suen and Yip (2005): 
0/* ddg  
With social status Chang et al. (2000): 0/* ddg  
Chen and Guo (2009): 
0/* ddg  
Panel C (two-sector model):  Lucas-type human capital formation  
No social status Marquis and Reffett (1991): 0/* ddg  Marquis and Reffett (1991): 0/* ddg  
With social status 
represented by k  
Chen (2011a): 
0/* ddg  
Chen (2011b): 
0/* ddg  
With social status 
represented by h  
This paper: 
0/* ddg  
This paper: 
0/* ddg  
With social status 
represented by k  and  h  
This paper: 
0/* ddg  
This paper: 
0/* ddg  
Note: Results of Suen and Yip (2005) shown in Table 1 correspond to the case where the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution is less than or equal to 1. 
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Table 2  The effects of μ, β and  when tt mc     
      *U  *z  *x  *g  Roots 
0.05 0.8 0.8 0.7689 0.0515 1.4212 0.0046 – + + +  
0.07 0.8 0.8 0.7655 0.0508 1.4158 0.0047 – + + + 
0.10 0.8 0.8 0.7606 0.0499 1.4079 0.0048 – + + + 
0.05 1.0 0.8 0.7942 0.0434 1.2119 0.0041 – + + + 
0.05 1.2 0.8 0.8169 0.0374 1.0644 0.0037 – + + + 
0.05 0.8 1.0 0.7029 0.0522 1.6000 0.0059 – + + + 
0.05 0.8 1.2 0.6476 0.0528 1.7784 0.0070 – + + + 
 
 
 
Table 3  The effects of μ, β and   when ttt mic       
      *U  *z  *x  *g  Roots 
0.05 0.8 0.8 0.6936 0.0574 1.2787 0.0061 – + + +  
0.07 0.8 0.8 0.6882 0.0581 1.3126 0.0062 – + + + 
0.10 0.8 0.8 0.6802 0.0590 1.3633 0.0064 – + + + 
0.05 1.0 0.8 0.7120 0.0484 1.0565 0.0058 – + + + 
0.05 1.2 0.8 0.7283 0.0419 0.8994 0.0054 – + + + 
0.05 0.8 1.0 0.6409 0.0581 1.5254 0.0072 – + + + 
0.05 0.8 1.2 0.5955 0.0586 1.7609 0.0081 – + + + 
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Figure 1  The determination of  *U  
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Appendix 
First, we study the effects of money growth rate by computing the first-order partial 
derivate of ),,(  UU  with respect to  . From Eq. (37b), we can derive that: 
),,(),,()]1())(1[(),,,( 

 UBUzUzBUBUU 

 , 
(A1) 
where            
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



 UBUz . 
Using Eq. (36d), we can obtain: 
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 
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zBUBU .             (A2) 
Substituting Eq. (A2) into Eq. (A1), we have: 
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Furthermore, differentiating ),,,( U  with respect to U  gives us: 
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where  
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Substituting Eqs. (37c) and (A5) into Eq. (A4) and evaluating this at UU , we have: 
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Note that from (A2), we have: 
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It follows that 
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Therefore, the first-order partial derivate of ),,(  UU  with respect to   
is: 
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We now turn to examine the effects of   by computing the first-order partial 
derivate of ),,(  UU  with respect to  . From Eq. (37b), we can derive that: 
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Substituting Eq. (A2) into Eq. (A8) and evaluating this at UU , we obtain:  
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Eqs. (A7) and (A9) imply that:  
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Finally, we study the effects of   by computing the first-order partial derivate of 
),,(  UU  with respect to  . From Eq. (37b), we can derive that: 
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Eqs. (A7) and (A10) imply that:  
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